

## Concepts of Justice in Different Types of Welfare Regimes

### I. The Basic Concept of Justice

Any discussion of justice can be seen in the context of Plato's dialogues.<sup>1</sup> The dialogue Republic Politeia deals with the significance of the just and the unjust, of justice and injustice for the actions of mankind. At first, it discusses the question whether a single person should strive to be just in his actions and way of living. Socrates pronounces himself in favour of this. Being just is a contribution to happiness (eudaimonia) and is in line with the soul of man.<sup>2</sup> Thus, he argues against the Sophists' opinion that unjust behaviour should be used to obtain power and success. Socrates particularly criticises an action that appears to be just but is of unjust character and that is propagated by the sophists.<sup>3</sup> Such behaviour would promote the dissemination of injustice, norms would get mixed up, the negative consequences for the living together of people would be considerable. Based on Durkheim, we would describe this as anomie, there would be the risks of social separation and discord, maybe even civil war.<sup>4</sup> Therefore Socrates seeks a frame of reference for the deeper understanding of justice. This frame of reference is the political order. Justice is defined with regard to the state. (368a ff)

First, it is questioned whether the different virtues of the population, their performance and activity patterns, would be part of the political order. If this was not the case, there

---

<sup>1</sup> Plato: Complete works. Translation into German by Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hamburg 1958. Especially the dialogues Politeira and Nomoi Politeia Laws Nomoi are relevant for this paper. In the following, this paper mainly refers to Politeia.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Barbara Zehnpfennig, Platon, (Politeia (385 BC) in: Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Ein Handbuch, published by Manfred Brocker, Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 14 – 30. Cf. also Rüdiger Bubner, „Wo jeder das Seinige tut, muß der Philosophenkönig engagiert werden“, in: Polis und Staat. Grundlinien der Politischen Philosophie, Frankfurt am Main 2002, pp. 51 – 70.

<sup>3</sup> “For the height of injustice is to seem just without being so.” (361a).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Emile Durkheim, The Anomic Division of Labour, in: The Division of Labour in Society, Frankfurt am Main, 1992, pp. 421 – 442. Cf. also Peter Waldmann, Einleitung: Zum Konzept des anomischen Staates, in: Der anomische Staat. Über Recht, öffentliche Sicherheit und Alltag in Lateinamerika, Opladen 2002, pp.7 – 20.

would be a risk of discord. After the description of life and the social contributions of the classes, the politicians, the guards and the merchants, justice is defined as a basic idea of the order which creates the connection and the division of labour among them. Today, we would say that a political order is just, if it integrates its citizens. Therefore, Plato's general definition of justice is "that one man should practise one thing only, the thing to which his nature was best adapted" or "to do one's own business." (433). A little further on, he writes: "Then on this view also justice will be admitted to be the having and doing what is a man's own, and belongs to him". (433). According to this, justice would be achieved if every citizen in a political community did his own task, followed his calling, voluntarily or under pressure.<sup>5</sup>

Alfred North Whitehead interpreted the history of European philosophy as a footnote to Plato.<sup>6</sup> Against the actuality of Plato's concept of justice, it may be argued that model basing on a natural order, on an estate based society (Ständegesellschaft) and on an image of humankind with fixed patterns of behaviour, is not useful any more. Nevertheless, from a current perspective, the question arises whether Plato did not set a standard by his understanding of a just integrative political order which is qualified by the fact that "everyone is doing his own task", which makes sense outside the reference to a closed state (Ständestaat) as well, and could be interpreted as modern. Based on Plato's idea, it is possible to think ahead in two directions: one could evaluate the state order which ensures or not ensures that its citizens are doing their own task, one could, however, also analyse the just and unjust elements in the actions taken by a powerful politician. The latter will lead to a discussion of the abuse of political power.

Most of all, however, the center of Plato's definition of justice is the thesis of an inseparable connexion between the life of the citizens and the political order: The citizens are not able to do their own tasks without the laws and rules of the state.

---

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, London 1945. In this book, Plato is accused of having designed a totalitarian state.

<sup>6</sup> "The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato." Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality. An Essay in Cosmology*, New York, London, 1979, p. 39. Cf. Christoph Kann, *Fußnoten zu Platon. Philosophiegeschichte bei A.N. Whitehead*, Hamburg 2001.

Outside such an order ensuring the equality of the citizens, the individual loses his own.<sup>7</sup> But the laws of the state are only legitimate if they enable the citizens to their own tasks. If we would link Plato's notion of justice with personal autonomy, equality of all people, freedom to a self-determined life, we would exaggerate the frame of interpretation. To deal with the question, whether one's own task is part of the free will of a human being, or is caused by an external force is a central problem of the modern philosophy of justice.

Opposed to Plato, however, are later ideas of natural law that understand the life of humankind within a state order as a loss of their "natural" freedom and are mainly directed against feudalistic systems. In contrast, "doing one's own task" semantically keeps showing up in concepts of freedom that do not reject the state as an integrating regulatory power that provides freedom, but makes it possible like Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Even the criticism of a political system that impairs the freedom of the individual and thus becomes unjust toward the individual could be associated with Plato's concept, considering the numerous dialogue sections that prompt the individual to take a critical position to opinions that had been common at that time. Even though Plato's concept of the good state is dominated by the idea that the ruling class, in Plato's case the philosophers, have insight in the well-being of their citizens, it must not be overlooked that the aim of the dialogues is to enhance the critical sense of judgement of the people talking and not to justify the political system. Plato's concept of justice initiates criticism of politics without relieving the state of its responsibility to establish a just order that integrates the citizens.<sup>8</sup>

Contrary to its reputation, Plato's philosophy can be repeatedly read as supporting to an individual's attitude of resistance to the collective, even though it is made clear that the individual would not be able to exist without the collective, neither in physical life nor as a spiritual being. Therefore, it is an even more serious business for Plato to ask questions concerning the political order. Plato places the concept of justice in the

---

<sup>7</sup> For the significance of the individual in Plato cf. Karl Heinz Haag, *Das Unwiederholbare*, in: *Philosophischer Idealismus*, Frankfurt am Main 1967, pp. 5 – 17.

<sup>8</sup> Uncritical behaviour directed at stabilising power per se is shown by the Sophists and not by Socrates who articulates Plato's opinion.

centre of his political philosophy which assigns the state the task of creating the preconditions for integration and equality so that everyone can do his own task. Thus, he, at least implicitly, makes a contribution to the definition of freedom as a subject of political philosophy. Aristotle follows him and brings up additional definitions.<sup>9</sup>

In Aristotle, especially in his definition of slaves as “tools”, it becomes clear that a concept of justice that is characterised by orientation to the natural order would describe issues as just that are considered absolutely unjust from today’s perspective. The Classical Era was not yet about *all* people, and it was not considered the state’s task to integrate *all* people. Slaves, women and Metics were not regarded as citizens whom politicians would owe, according to the philosophers, the establishment of a just order.<sup>10</sup>

Against the backdrop of the arbitrary decision of a basic democratic institution, the ostracism, the trial of Socrates, the death sentence, Socrates’ refusal to flee and the self-enforcement of the sentence by the convict raises a justice-related problem that was difficult to solve using the legal concepts of that time. Defining justice on the basis of a political order that declared human rights and human dignity as basic law in its constitutional make-up was still far away. However, we must not forget that principles of the rule of law, political systems and the actual integration of the population are still different matters.

---

<sup>9</sup> Aristotle, *Politics*. Translated and published by Olaf Gigon. Munich 1978. “[...] the good in the political field, that is, the general advantages justice, it is therefore thought by all men that justice is some sort of equality, and up to a certain point at all events they agree with the philosophical discourses in which conclusions have been reached about questions of ethics. For justice is a quality of a thing in relation to persons, and they hold that for persons that are equal the thing must be equal. But equality in what characteristics does this mean, and inequality in what? This must be made clear, since this too raises a difficulty, and calls for political philosophy.” (1282 b 20). Cf. the interpretation by Rüdiger Bubner “Gerechtigkeit herrscht, wo jeder das Seinige tut“, in: *Freiheit oder Gerechtigkeit. Perspektiven Politischer Philosophie*, Leipzig 1995, pp. 176 – 193.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. on real history: Christian Meier, *Die Entstehung des Politischen bei den Griechen*, Frankfurt 1980. Peter Funke writes: “... auch in der Blütezeit der athenischen Demokratie alle politischen Kompetenzen in den Händen von höchstens 15% der Gesamtbevölkerung lagen.” (p. 60). Peter Funke, *Athen in Klassischer Zeit*, Munich 1999.

## **II. Justice, Freedom, Equality, Integration**

As the images of human nature due to the change due to the influences of Christianity and due to the humanism, but mostly due to the Enlightenment and German idealism, the concepts of freedom and equality, which remain implicit in the ancient understanding of justice, develop their own, well-differentiated contexts and interpretations. New aspects of human existence are considered, and humankind is increasingly chosen as a new reference. Step by step, justice is distinguished from right and right is distinguished from law. Morality and morals are separated as well from philosophy, politics and religion. Human existence, and thus the contexts in which issues of justice are raised and discussed, is perceived in a more complex way.

The difficulties of defining the concept of justice are aggravated by the fact that the philosophy of the Enlightenment separates the substantiation of freedom and political order. Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for example, criticise the feudalistic practice of power on the basis of a definition of freedom founded on natural law: All humans are free as natural creatures. The political order takes this freedom from them, laws restrict their natural rights. Security and integration by the state mean a loss of freedom. The connection between political order and the concept of justice in the tradition of Plato and Aristotle is revoked, or reversed: The state becomes an entity of constraint and subordination which negates the freedom of all men.

In many states on the European continent, the cruel civil and denominational wars make the state appear as the only power suitable to establish peace and justice. Considerable differences in the idea of political order become apparent between the continental state concept, which is characterised by this experience, and the Anglo-

Saxon state concept.<sup>11</sup> The continental development is rather in line with the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, who travelled to France several times, than with John Locke's. According to Hobbes, the subjugation of the citizens is not reprehensible as long as the Leviathan ends the civil war and ensures peace. The essence of his state theory is that the citizens have to submit to the laws issued by the Leviathan and to comply with its contract. The question whether or not the laws represent a just order is not being given priority. He advises the Leviathan not to deliberately destroy the customs of his citizens. Within the state, the individual is not entitled to just treatment, outside the state, however, in the natural state, where everybody is free, there is neither justice nor integration.<sup>12</sup>

For John Locke, in contrast, the violation of individual freedom, founded on possession and property, by an intervening state raises problems of legitimacy and justice. The Anglo-Saxon state concept, following Locke's philosophy, sees the free agreement and formation of a will of citizens as the basis for the exertion of political power. People per se are free and mature and merely need the state to correct and monitor the social contract initiated by mature citizens. At the present, Anglo-Saxon justice-related philosophies deal with definition procedures and the approval by mature citizens who are equal by constitution, who independently implement their expectations and who do not need a state to do that. This becomes particularly clear in John Rawls.<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>11</sup> „Der moderne Staat entstand in Gestalt des absoluten Staates, und zwar nicht aus dem Machtstreben der Fürsten und der Unachtsamkeit der Gesellschaft, sondern aus der gesellschaftlichen Lage, die die konfessionellen Bürgerkriege heraufbeschworen hatten. Staat und Souveränität waren neue Begriffe, mit denen die veränderte politische Wirklichkeit erfasst wurde. Das erklärt zugleich, warum in England weder der Begriff des Staates und der Souveränität, noch die Unterscheidung von Staat und Gesellschaft, öffentlichem und privatem Recht in derselben Weise aufkommen konnten. Es fehlt am realen Substrat dieser Begriffe. Die englische Krone besaß Prärogativen, aber keine oberste Gewalt. Es erhielt sich vielmehr eine Anzahl unabhängiger Gewalten, und vor allem das common law und sein Sachwalter, die Gerichte, konnten eine von der Krone relativ unabhängige Position behaupten. Der wichtigste Grund dafür liegt in einem frühzeitigen Verfall des Feudalsystems mit der Konsequenz, dass Adel und Bürgertum sich nicht scharf gegeneinander abgrenzten und infolgedessen das Land als Ganzes ein Gegengewicht zum Herrscher bildete.“ Dieter Grimm, *Recht und Staat der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft*, Frankfurt am Main 1987, p. 61.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Stuttgart, 1974.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. John Locke, *Über die Regierung (The Second Treatise of Government)*. In der Übersetzung von Dorothee Tidow, Reinbek bei Hamburg 1966; cf. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1971.

In the course of absolutistic forms of rule and their revolutionary defeat, which required revolutionary state power, G. W. F. Hegel writes, contrary to the philosophy of the Enlightenment esteemed by him, that the state was the “reality of freedom”. In his philosophy of right, Hegel prepares a model state that makes the freedom of its citizens the general and thus equality-ensuring legal basis. State, family and civil society are distinguished as different spheres containing their own rules of conduct and codes of practice, values and experience which form the lives of the individuals. With its corporations, however, the state limits the sphere of civil society and its tendency toward extreme inequality. Thus, for Hegel justice comprises both the validity of a general law which grants the same freedom and the same basic rights to every individual, and the legal protection of different spheres of action such as acting in a market-economy environment or loving passionately. This even allows room for unjust behaviour.<sup>14</sup> The state allows the citizens freedoms to decide for different “spheres of justice” (Michael Walzer), and still integrates them by means of a global legal system and politics. These different freedoms are protected and limited by corporations.<sup>15</sup> The significance Hegel places on the corporations, the division of labour between state and civil society (market), and the emphasis on a control function for the state that creates order, repeatedly give reason to identify an early blueprint of the ideas of “the German model of capitalism (Rheinischer Kapitalismus) in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and state.<sup>16</sup> In the German model of capitalism, too, different concepts of integration and justice are institutionalised and politically controlled at the same time.

The Right and Left Hegelians dispute about the extent to which the state was obliged to ensure a just order that goes beyond the legal equality of citizens, and includes political and social aspects, did not question the centering of the state of Hegelian philosophy: The great emancipation movements of the bourgeoisie and the working class rebelled against disorder and immaturity and fought for civil, political and social

---

<sup>14</sup> Christianity assumes that God loves all men, but men do not love for reasons of justice, and if they love they are not just.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Theorie Werkausgabe Band 7, Frankfurt am Main 1970. Cf. also Rüdiger Bubner, *Hegels Staatsbegriff*, in: ders., *Polis und Staat. Grundlinien der Politischen Philosophie*, Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 153 – 173.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Prominent economic historian Werner Abelshauser from Bielefeld keeps referring to this connection. Most recently: Werner Abelshauser, *Des Kaisers Neue Kleider? Wandlungen der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft*, Broschüre des Roman Herzog Instituts 2009, pp. 15 et seq.

freedoms. It is due to them that the freedoms attained do not consist of arbitrarily granted acts of grace but have been institutionalised and become permanent and generalised as basic rights for all citizens. The definition of basic rights and the inclusion of these basic rights in the constitutional fundamentals of the states represents a major step in the interpretation and realisation of the Platonic concept of justice.

In his reconstruction of western civilisation, the famous British theorist of the modern welfare state T. H. Marshall (1893 – 1981) focuses on the steps of emancipation of the populations which are expressed in the granting of citizen rights. He bases his argument on the following developments: In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, civil rights ensuring individual freedoms have been attained, in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the rights to participate in political power have been achieved, and in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, social rights are gradually established which ensure access to economic welfare and social security for the individual. The institutions of the welfare state, with which expectations of freedom, equality and integration are associated and make up a special part of a political order, are based on the idea of justice.<sup>17</sup>

While the significance of civil and political rights for the emancipation and education of individuals is undisputed in modern societies, the social rights and their implementation in a social state are politically highly controversial. In the past twenty years, for example, the neo-liberal position kept arguing that in the era of globalisation the continental social states suffered considerable competitive disadvantages compared to Anglo-Saxon capitalism, were less flexible and would not be able to maintain the achieve wealth in the long term. The high unemployment rate is mentioned as an indicator. However, the Anglo-Saxon models of restraint on the part of the state and intensive market orientation are fraught with undesired social consequences such as an intensive social rift. The deficiencies of social justice are discussed within both systems, although the perception of the problems differs a lot.

The concept of justice in according to Plato allows a comprehensive and fundamental

---

<sup>17</sup> Cf. T. H. Marshall, Staatsbürgerrechte und soziale Klassen, in: Bürgerrechte und soziale Klassen. Zur Soziologie des Wohlfahrtsstaates, Frankfurt am Main 1992, pp. 33 – 94.

perspective of interpretation and evaluation of human relations and thus avoids an exclusive allocation to specific subjects, such as personal tragedies, living conditions and legal systems, for example. Especially in this function, it is indispensable. Most of all, the concept provides a dynamic and power-critical potential for evaluation competence with regard to general, effective concepts of order, which is essential for democratic publics and social movements.

### **III. Ideas, Interests, Institutions**

Modern societies cannot be democratically governed on the basis of the rule of law over a longer period of time if this opposes the concepts of justice predominant among the population. Ideas of a just society are normally an implicit component of the cognitive maps of people used to evaluate the political and social order. Therefore, governments face the pressure of having to present their politics as just in line with the population on the one hand, and having to ensure that traditional concepts of justice will be democratically further developed in popular perception and that new topics and challenges will be processed. In Germany, certainly not only the political parties are tasked with that, but institutions of the educational system and of all civil society institutions as well. At the same time, however, it is not clear how and by what the major people's parties are to be replaced, which perform this function to a decreasing extent. According to political scientist Franz Walter from Göttingen, one of the reasons for this is that the parties' leading elites have hardly any connections to the lower socio-economically precarious and educationally disadvantaged social classes, and thus exert less influence on them.<sup>18</sup>

The traditional and overlaying concepts of justice that predominate among the population and exert influence on the structure and development of institutions and the decision-making of governments are rarely homogenous. They are affected by

---

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Franz Walter, *Baustelle Deutschland*, Frankfurt am Main 2008; *Im Herbst der Volksparteien. Eine kleine Geschichte von Aufstieg und Rückgang politischer Massenintegration*, Bielefeld 2009; *Prekariat-Studie; Fatale Furcht ergreift die ewigen Verlierer*, SPIEGEL ONLINE, 2 April 2009 "<http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/O>" <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/O>, 1546, druck-616392, 00html.

traditions, mentalities, historical experience and its medial processing. Social movements and the programmes of parties, associations and popular initiatives representing these movements and their ability to mobilise the base play an important role. An important role is also played by religious dogmas and their secularised interpretations. In addition, multicultural influence brought in by immigrants may be exerted as well. It is of major importance, to which extent the institutions of the educational system will succeed in conveying concepts of justice to the following generations.

With caution, empirically effective concepts of justice can be allocated to a collective awareness as defined by Emile Durkheim, on the basis of which individuals and collectives perceive and interpret social facts. Since modern societies are organised as working societies and social states, the life courses of individuals are characterised by their chances on the labour market, their belonging to social classes and the institutions of the welfare state which contribute to opening up opportunities, to minimizing risks and to promoting social mobility. Therefore, the social state arrangements uphold the social concept of a just and integrative order in a very special way. Particularly in modern societies, in which the bonds and support of individuals by traditional communities such as families, religious and neighbourhood communities decrease, the institutions of the social and welfare state play a mediating role, function as a social “glue”, and contribute to cohesion. The expectations may differ within the different countries and groups of the population, ranging from the hope of being caught in the event of a fall or getting a new chance, to the improvement of their income situation or the prospect of a life free from cares. Disappointment and the loss of confidence are a grave issue in any case and pose a potential for conflict that brings about disintegration, rifts and aggressions.<sup>19</sup>

---

<sup>19</sup> Lutz Leisering provided an analysis of the discourses on justice with an effect on politics conducted in Germany in the past decades. in the end, some questions remain open: „Ist die reformistische, sozialstaatliche Perspektive reformierbar, insbesondere nach dem konzeptionellen Leerlaufen der Sozialdemokratie und dem Erstarken von Parteien links von der SPD, die „soziale Gerechtigkeit“ als sozialstaatliche Restaurationssemantik verwenden?“ Lutz Leisering, Gerechtigkeitsdiskurse im Umbau des deutschen Sozialstaats, in: Stefan Empter, Robert B. Vehrkamp (Editors), Soziale Gerechtigkeit – Bestandsaufnahme, Gütersloh 2007, pp.77 – 108, here p. 103.

In Germany, the Basic Law establishes the connection between human dignity, freedom, equality and justice. Subsequent to the inviolability of human dignity and the duty of all state authority to protect it (Article 1 (Paragraph 1), it reads: “The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and justice in the world.” (Basic Law, Article 1, Paragraph 2), followed by articles demanding personal freedom and equality before the law. Further on in Article 20, the political system in Germany is defined as “a democratic and social federal state”.<sup>20</sup> Between the legal fixation of such basal ideas of justice and the political concepts, however, there is “a wide field” (Theodor Fontane) of leeway for creativity and interpretation. Even at the present time, the definition of equality and integration as a prerequisite for the establishment of a just social order still is the subject of fights for political rule and power, and a priority topic of social politics.

In Germany a vehement discourse on justice has flared up, triggered by the perception of social rift and crises, which mainly focuses on ostensible examples such as managerial salaries and social assistance benefits (the so-called “Hartz IV”). We consider it progressive to ask which concepts of justice substantially dominated and are still dominating the socio-political path here in Germany. For our analysis, we refer to the typology of welfare state regimes developed by the Danish political scientist Gøsta Esping-Andersen. His analyses allows to a discussion of different concepts of justice and a critical verification of their implicit assumptions and institutional preconditions.<sup>21</sup>

#### **IV. Concepts of Justice in a Conservative-Corporate Welfare Regime**

##### **1. Different Welfare States, Different Capitalisms**

Gøsta Esping-Andersen has strongly influenced the latest state of research on welfare

---

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Hans F. Zacher, *Der deutsche Sozialstaat am Ende des Jahrhunderts*, in: Stephan Leibfried, Uwe Wagschal (Editors), *Der deutsche Sozialstaat, Bilanzen – Reformen – Perspektiven*, Frankfurt/Main, 2000, pp. 53-90, here pp. 56 et seq.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Gøsta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Political Economies of the Welfare State*, in: *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Cambridge 2003, pp. 9 – 78.

states. Besides the typology of three welfare regimes developed by him, especially his insight that there is no such thing as “the” welfare state, has gained acceptance. According to him, welfare states were characterised by the implementation of different programmes, the involvement of parties and of social movements, the integration and exclusion of population groups and by the influence exerted by traditional fundamental cultural patterns of order and legitimacy. The aims range from securing livelihood on the brink of poverty via maintaining the current status, up to high-level social security.<sup>22</sup>

As shown by Gøsta Esping-Andersen, the understanding and orientation of welfare state institutions vary according to the paths taken by the nation states (“ghost of the institutional path”), which cannot be easily left in times of Europeanisation and globalisation either. They are based on the compromises and consensuses achieved by the parties in social struggles. Their bearers were able to establish and strengthen their social position and power on the foundation of the existence of these institutions.

In contrast to many globalisation theories, Gøsta Esping-Andersen assumes that the transition of advanced modern society from an industrial to a service society, that can be observed worldwide, takes place according to endogenous development paths and structural patterns controlled by socio-political decisions in times of globalisation and Europeanisation as well.<sup>23</sup>

Nevertheless, the debates on globalisation conducted in the past twenty years have affected the self-perception of many continental national states and the concept of their social politics. In many places, the governments enforced an increasing focus on market processes and the reorganisation of socio-political arrangements in response to globalisation. As a matter of fact, political strategies that typically come from an Anglo-Saxon context had been implemented into continental policy settings, such as

---

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Fritz Scharpf, *Sozialstaaten in der Globalisierungsfalle? Lehren aus dem internationalen Vergleich*; in: Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, *Jahrbuch 2000*, Munich, pp. 59 – 73.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Gøsta Esping-Andersen *Post-Industrial Structures: An Analytical Framework*, in: Gøsta Esping-Andersen (Ed.), *Chancing Classes. Stratification and Mobility in Post-Industrial Societies*, London, Newbury Park, New Delhi 1993, pp. 7 – 31.

“from work to welfare” originating in the USA and implemented by Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder.<sup>24</sup> However, this policy increasingly faced criticism. Upon the outbreak of the financial market crisis which started in the USA, the call for revision and a recall of the concepts of order and justice on which the continental systems are founded cannot be ignored. In Iceland, which was considered a neo-liberal model state, and which got into a serious banking crisis, a radical political change was initiated a few months after the devastating extent of the banking crisis became obvious.

Many people feel the need to search for the causes of the crises and to raise the question as to which extent a crisis that abruptly wipes out social capital and the life perspectives of people is not an acceptable but an avoidable injustice. Therefore, it is logical to debate different models of capitalism, as the former general manager of a big French insurance company, Michel Albert, initiated.<sup>25</sup> Albert is mainly interested in an analysis of the differences between continental capitalism (le modèle rhénan) and Anglo-Saxon capitalism (le modèle néo-américain).<sup>26</sup> Typical examples for “le modèle rhénan” include Germany and France. His central thesis is that there is no such thing as “the” capitalism. In his opinion, the conflict between “le modèle rhénan” and “le modèle néo-américain” has replaced the system rivalry between East and West, between socialism and capitalism, and has been ideologically, politically and economically rampaging beyond national borders. Albert presumes that the decisive battles will be fought on EU territory. He raises the question as to which capitalist system is closest to the concept of just participation. His plea in favour of “rhénan” capitalism primarily aims at the significance of the “mixed” and “public” goods such as infrastructures, education, health care, and security which offer chances for participation in a society of social injustice, while neo Americanism minimises the

---

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Tony Blair, Gerhard Schröder, *Der Weg nach vorne für Europa*, no indication of place of publication, 1999.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Michel Albert, *Kapitalismus contra Kapitalismus*, Frankfurt/Main 1992. A more recent contribution by Michel Albert is “Die Zukunft der Sozialmodelle des europäischen Kontinents”, in: Wolfgang Streeck (Ed.): *Internationale Wirtschaft, nationale Demokratie*, Frankfurt/M. 1998, pp. 195 – 209.

<sup>26</sup> Hall and Soskice use the terms “coordinated market economies” and “liberal market economies” for a similar purpose, cf. Peter A. Hall, David Soskice, *An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism*, in: Peter A. Hall, David Soskice (Ed.), *Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*, Oxford, 2001, pp. 1 – 68.

provision of public goods and thus increases social injustice.<sup>27</sup>

These considerations lead back to Esping-Andersen, who makes a distinction between the development of social politics in the Scandinavian countries and the “rhéna” countries. He does not only base his analyses on the functional systems state and market, but also integrates the significance of the family system and thus contributes to a better understanding of the different concepts of justice that refer to the respective dominant functional systems.

Combining central characteristics which show deviation if applied to specific reference societies, his ideal-type analysis allows an overall view of cultural, socio-economic, and political developments. Despite manifold criticism in the specialist literature, the models designed by him still contribute to identifying characteristic paths which are followed by real existing welfare states.<sup>28</sup> The current discussion about different models of capitalism (Rheinischer versus Angelsächsischer Kapitalismus) for example, confirmed and specified rather than falsified the application of the conservative corporate ideal type to Germany.

## **2. Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism**

### *Social rights*

Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s construction of types of welfare states is based on of several argumentation levels and criteria:

Foremost is the concept of social rights.<sup>29</sup> The basic idea is that the access to welfare services is governed by rights applying to every single citizen. Linked with that is a concept of justice that ensures that individuals do not become personally dependent on other people. This spares them feeling humiliated in front of others, forced to be

---

<sup>27</sup> Michel Albert, loc. cit. 1992, pp. 106 et seq.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. our book: Christiane Bender, Hans Graßl, *Arbeiten und Leben in der Dienstleistungsgesellschaft*, Konstanz 2004.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Gøsta Esping-Andersen, loc. cit., 2003, pp. 21 et seq.

thankful or confronted the inability to reciprocate.<sup>30</sup> As the legislative power, the state is obliged to ensure that legal rights can be made up by corresponding services. The labelling of the range within which these welfare benefits are guaranteed as social rights provides the basis for the distinction of the different welfare regimes.

The Scandinavian states ensure the broadest access to welfare benefits by social rights, which, according to Esping-Andersen, belong to the *social-democratic type of welfare regime*. Welfare benefits such as risk protection, education, health care, professional education, re-integration into the labour market are granted as citizenship rights. Esping-Andersen considers Sweden, which he repeatedly analysed, as an example of a generously integrative and egalitarian society.<sup>31</sup> Individuals receive continuous support by the state throughout their life. The aim pursued by the state, however, is that the support measures are ended with by the beginning of gainful employment. This model is suspected of being particularly “egalitarian” in terms of bureaucracy, and thus unjust toward personal fates. However, this is opposed by the fact that the personnel-intensive public sector makes an effort to implement measures that focusing on individual cases.

In the countries of Central and South Europe, which are combined in the model of the *conservative corporate welfare regime*, social rights are granted, but the concept of order behind them and the associated concept of justice are totally different. Let us take the example of Germany: Most welfare benefits are not granted as citizenship rights but are dependent on employment status. The supporting pillar of the German social state, social insurance, protects employees and their family members (spouse and children) from social risks, however, at very different levels, depending on the amount and period of the contributing payment. The legal cash management system

---

<sup>30</sup> From a strictly platonic perspective, it is better for the soul to do good than to receive good. According to this, altruism and egoism are not too far apart from each other. The question is, how the person feels who is dependent on voluntary assistance in an emergency situation. In contrast to support within a family where close relationships and emotions, a joint past, and opportunities for reciprocity make it less offending to accept help, the dependence on more or less coincidental support by strangers with no opportunity for reciprocity can be perceived as offending. If one is “taken care of” by a person on a professional basis, the feeling of offence may be less intense because this person is “just doing his or her job”.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Gøsta Esping Andersen, *Politics against Markets, The Social Democratic Road to Power*, Princeton, 1985.

supervised by the state and the private insurance companies pay according to the employees' employment status on the labour market and according to income. The state ensures a statutory minimum allowance for those who are not available to the labour market. They are protected from serious material hardship. However, the integration service rendered hardly levels out social inequalities. Reparatively designed and not including the educational system, the predominant concept of social politics aims at stabilising differences in society. Thus, justice is understood as the protection and stabilisation of the economic, social and cultural status obtained by classes, strata and families.<sup>32</sup>

In the Anglo-Saxon countries featuring the *liberal welfare regime* model, state benefits merely contribute to securing people's livelihood, not even to avoiding poverty. Social rights are granted at a very low level. The basic idea of social politics focuses on self aid and empowerment. The legislator rather tends to cut social benefits than extending them. It promotes those who help themselves, for example, in the form of private life insurance. The legal right to social assistance in the case of incapability (of gainful employment) is determined by verifying the needs of persons in need and is quite low. The same applies to the payment of legal old-age insurance. Due to fiscal policy measures, the support measures granted by the federal states for employees are below the statutory minimum wage. To compensate for this low assistance by the state, voluntary support initiatives such as neighbourhood work, honorary positions, foundations, popular initiatives and support groups play an important role. Since the state is traditionally not available as an addressee for claims for social justice in the Anglo-Saxon state theory, the citizens feel obliged to become active themselves within the meaning of civil society. Their activities represent commitment and empathy, but also attention for oneself and salvation of one's conscience. The causes of deprivation remain unaffected.<sup>33</sup> In this welfare regime, there is barely any integration, the integrating entity in the Anglo-Saxon countries is the labour market.

---

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, *Herausforderungen des Sozialstaates*, Frankfurt am Main 1997.

<sup>33</sup> This is the reason why we do not feel good with regard to authors like Alastair MacIntyre, Michael Walzer and Amitai Etzioni who feel obliged to promote communitarianism.

### *Decommodification*

At the second level of argumentation, Esping-Andersen deals with the central criterion of decommodification.<sup>34</sup> Associated with that is criticism of Karl Marx. According to Esping-Andersen, analyses of socio-political arrangements that are detectable in all modern industrial state disprove the prognosis by Marx and later Marxists saying that an increasing part of the population will be dependent on the labour market, on selling one's workforce as a good. On the contrary. Although all modern societies are characterised by the fact that an increasing part of the population makes their living by gainful employment, this does not mean that their income is a consequence of their employment alone. Even though purpose and dimension strongly vary in terms of quality and quantity, minimum allowance, social insurance, transfer payments such as local cost-of-living allowances, child benefit and parental allowance, and remuneration in the public service, are income contributions that are granted independently of the labour market. In Germany, the share of such transfer payments in the household income increases permanently. Therefore, social politics, says Esping-Andersen, deeply affect the socio-structural system of strata, classes and milieu. Esping-Andersen classifies the welfare state in accordance with the range of these interventions.

Repeatedly referring to Sweden as a paradigm, the model of the *social-democratic welfare regime* ensures social security at a high middle-class level. There is hardly any risk of poverty. Especially the risks of the labour market are compensated for by socio-political instruments that allow progress for the individual. Charity work as in the Anglo-Saxon countries is barely practised in the fields of poverty relief, and support services for families and individuals (soup kitchens, food banks, fund raising). The state church, too, plays a minor role in social support and integration.<sup>35</sup>

---

<sup>34</sup> "It is as markets become universal and hegemonic that the welfare of individuals comes to depend entirely on the cash nexus. Stripping society of the institutional layers that guaranteed social reproduction outside the labor contract meant that people were commodified. In turn, the introduction of modern social rights implies a loosening of the pure commodity status. De-commodification occurs when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market." Gøsta Esping-Andersen, loc. cit., 2003, p. 21 et seq.

<sup>35</sup> Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, *Varianten des Wohlfahrtsstaats*, Frankfurt am Main 2003, pp. 161 – 204.

The model of the *conservative corporate welfare regime*, Germany often in the focus of the analysis, is based on the protection of individual classes, strata and occupational groups from existential hardships. Social politics are intended to have a cushioning effect and are therefore designed for status preservation, also in the case of occurring risks. The women research community reproached Esping-Andersen with not having pointed out the limited decommodification opportunities for women separately, which either resulted from their dependence on their husbands or often were rather low due to their intermittent labour force participation.<sup>36</sup> In the European Union, Germany and France provides the greatest family-political services. In both countries, families receive considerable transfer payments that make them less dependent on the labour market.<sup>37</sup> The community work of the churches, the welfare associations and numerous popular initiatives contribute to supporting people in risky living situations.

In the model of the liberal welfare regime, people not capable of working are granted social assistance related to their needs to ensure their survival, otherwise, however, policy refrains from implementing interventional measures in the field of social politics. For the individual employee, the chance is low to avoid poverty outside his or her labour force participation. The dependency of those in precarious on Charity is great.

---

<sup>36</sup> Cf. among others Julia S. O'Connor, From Women in the Welfare State to Gendering Welfare State Regimes, in: *Current Sociology*, Journal of the International Sociological Association, Volume 44, Number 2, Summer 1996, London, p. 61 et seq.; Ann Orloff, Gender and the Social Rights of Citizenship: State Policies and Gender Relations in Comparative Research, in: *American Sociological Review*, 58, 3/1993, pp. 303 – 328; Annette Borchorst, Welfare State Regimes, Women's Interests and the EC, in Diane Sainsbury (ed.), *Gendering Welfare States*, London 1994, pp. 26 – 44. Esping-Andersen responded to this criticism in: *Comparative Welfare Regimes Re-examined*, in: *Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies*, Oxford 2000, pp. 73 – 98; cf. Gøsta Esping-Andersen, A New Gender Contract, in, Gøsta Esping-Andersen, *Why We Need a New Welfare State*, Oxford, New York 2003, pp. 68 – 95.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, loc. cit. 2003, zur Frankreich und Deutschland: pp. 213 – 247 and pp.248 – 280.

*The Systems State, Family, Market*

At a third level of argumentation, Esping-Andersen introduces the existing socio-political concepts of order that lead to favouring the systems state, family (private households), or market. Within the development paths of the national states, the concepts of freedom, equality, integration, and justice are linked with different institutions and interpretations.

In the Anglo-Saxon countries with their tradition of criticizing the state and its politics these notions have been linked with the formation of a free market economy. Markets are considered as distributors of welfare and justice. Welfare benefits should be granted to those who have earned it by gainful employment.<sup>38</sup>

Conversely, the strong importance of the state was preserved in the continental European states in which the absolutistic systems could only be removed by establishing new power structures. The middle class had to fight against the ruling representatives of the old world, but especially in Germany, Austria and Italy, it imitated the “old world”, looked for alliances and dissociated itself from the rising working class. In Sweden, in contrast, the “strong position of free peasants” (Franz-Xaver Kaufmann) played a major role.<sup>39</sup>

In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the countries of the *social-democratic welfare regime* were characterised by coalitions of peasants, bourgeois, and rising working classes, even with monarchy. Social-democratic governments were continually in power over longer periods and thus able to implement their concepts. The state serves as the key instrument for the attainment of social demands. It is prominently considered the addressee that has to provide for a just social order, integration and general welfare. This includes the task of ensuring an adequate provision for the citizens, and compensating for social, family-related, regional, and ethnic inequalities that impede

---

<sup>38</sup> For this, evidence can be found in the sources Max Weber analysed for his Protestant Ethic.

<sup>39</sup> “Skandinavische Forscher sehen in dieser starken Stellung des Bauerntums einen entscheidenden Faktor für die Entstehung des volksweiten und nicht auf die Industriearbeiterschaft beschränkten skandinavischen Modells der Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit.“, in: Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, loc. cit. 2003, p.164.

social participation. In the national identity of the Scandinavian states, the collective goods accessible to all, well-developed infrastructures and a professionally run public service maintain a prominent position in order to give the population an equal share in welfare. “Welfare for all” is a legitimate objective of social politics and is largely accepted. Economically, this is achieved by reallocation of profits, high consumption taxes and a high tax burden on the population. This requires an attitude of solidarity among the population.<sup>40</sup> The idea that justice means not forcing anybody, but leaving it up to everybody to freely choose how to organise their social security is alien to the system. The individual cannot improve his living conditions by taking advantage of his financial resources, but merely by the democratic formation of will.

In the countries of *conservative corporate welfare regimes*, the state is considered the authority that controls social processes and that intervenes in the laws of the market. This is particularly due to corporatism and a close cooperation and task sharing between state, churches and associations. The political sector support the associations, which in turn obtain major advantages for their members. On the one hand, they accomplished considerable integration, on the other hand, it is difficult for new social groups to enforce their right to participation. From this perspective, Germany appears as a highly organised civil society. Distributing welfare to everybody in equal shares is not the aim. The German variant of the continental capitalism (Rheinischer Kapitalismus) links the conservative element of maintaining the achieved, strengthening and protecting families from risks, and the liberal element of delegating tasks of social and labour market politics and stabilising the power of the citizens.<sup>41</sup> For example, many tasks of sovereignty are not performed by state authorities but by “corporations under public law” (Körperschaften des öffentlichen Rechts) in order to provide areas of activity for the “organised power of citizens”.

The establishment of the principle of subsidiarity as a basic concept of order requires the state to refrain from interfering with family matters or with areas that can be

---

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Hartmut Häußermann, Walter Siebel, *Dienstleistungsgesellschaften*, Frankfurt/Main 1995, pp. 67 – 80, here: p. 72 et seq.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, *Sozialpolitisches Denken*, Frankfurt am Main 2003a

covered by civil society organisations, churches, associations, or clubs.<sup>42</sup> Here, justice means protecting existing structures and inequalities. Promoting the autonomy of families is considered a socio-political aim. This becomes apparent in the conceptually and theoretically founded differentiation of upbringing and educational tasks.<sup>43</sup> In literature, this form of social politics is occasionally labelled “tailored to needs”, however, it is overlooked that family policy used to be geared to the so-called “strong housewife-breadwinner model” for a long time and the other family members, wives and children, did not naturally benefit from it. In the context of this family model, a distinct special morality was able to last, which split the concepts of justice according to gender. The rigid forms of gender-specific division of labour are gradually eroding. Therefore, the German social state, which is founded on the activities of families and civil society, offers relatively few public services.<sup>44</sup>

This is, however, what becomes obvious in comparison with the Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon welfare states: In Sweden, it is primarily the state that has to provide for justice and to actively integrate groups of the population that get into a precarious situation in order to ensure them roughly equal participation opportunities. In the USA, on the other hand, it is mainly the market, especially the barely regulated labour market, that provides central integration results. The considerable social differences are hardly seen as a basic injustice. In Germany, in contrast, the state shares socio-political tasks of integration with corporations, associations, churches and families. In addition, many things (such as social housing (Sozialer Wohnungsbau)) of central importance for life support, that are solely provided by the state in Sweden and solely provided by market economy in the USA, are provided by the market, general economic bodies (Gemeinwirtschaft) and by the local government in Germany. Here, the concept of justice refers to a social order in which the political sector takes

---

<sup>42</sup> Cf. Christoph Sachße, *Subsidiarität: Leitmaxime deutscher Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit*, in: Stefan Lessenich (Ed.), *Wohlfahrtsstaatliche Grundbegriffe. Historische und aktuelle Diskurse*, Frankfurt/New York 2003, pp. 191 – 212.

<sup>43</sup> Hans Graßl provides a comparative study of the educational systems in Germany, Sweden, and the USA. Cf. Hans Graßl, *Ökonomisierung der Bildungsproduktion. Zu einer Theorie des konservativen Bildungsstaats*, Baden-Baden 2008.

<sup>44</sup> See table on page 184: Christiane Bender, Hans Graßl, Markus Schaal, *Der Schweizer Arbeitsmarkt: Sonderfall unter Modernisierungsdruck*, in: Thomas S. Eberle, Kurt Imhof (Ed.) *Sonderfall Schweiz*, Zurich 2007, pp. 172 – 187.

intervening actions, the significance of the market for the availability of opportunities plays a major role, but at the same time, alternative family-related and civil society forms of access to welfare are promoted. Thus, different concepts of justice co-exist in Germany, each one of them represented by particular liberal, conservative and social-democratic groups, but also represented by the corresponding regulations of the social state. In other words: Due to simultaneous political control, a great number of options are available so that one can choose between market offers, which the individual has to finance himself, offers that are influenced by religion or ideology but promoted by the state, and offers by the state (at municipality, Länder and federal levels).

From the Anglo-Saxon point of view, the continental welfare state has never been described as particularly integrative, but as regimes that act patriarchally and exclusively and serve their bearers such as the civil servants or the organised stakeholders of the associations. The high and increasing unemployment rate is pointed out, as well as the big problems of integrating new social groups that do not have a “lobby” yet into society and economy.

From the perspective of the *liberal welfare regime*, the idea of social justice based on a governmental institutional order is alien to the system and not desirable but obstructive to the optimisation of individual opportunities that can be primarily provided by the market. The differences in inequality and prosperity do not pose any fundamental justice-related problems, but provide an incentive for the individuals to increase their efforts. Instead, it is called for as much market power as possible, the interventions by state and politics are not believed to be very successful anyway. This form of justice is frequently equated with justice based on performance and achievement. However, it has to be taken into account that the accumulation of economic capital by market participants is accompanied by the enhancement of their social and cultural opportunities of participation, i.e. with normatively presenting their contributions as higher-level achievements. In view of the “achievement” of the elites of the financial market in the USA, where by they have ruined the private old-age provisions of hundreds of thousands of Americans, the formula of justice applied in the liberal model, justice is what market participants define as just, becomes doubtful.

## V. Gaps of Justice within the Conservative Corporate Welfare State in Germany

The paths and courses set featured by the three models of welfare state regimes are, as already has become obvious, linked with traditions of different expectations regarding justice. Essentially, the question is to which extent social politics has to intervene in order to establish a just order. Naturally, the answers to this questions differ greatly. The perception of social injustice, marginalisation, and exclusions as justice-related problems is very different in the three welfare systems, as is the inclination of the majority of the population to agree on solutions.

Finally, we are now addressing the gaps of justice that have influenced the form of continental capitalism (Rheinischer Kapitalismus) or the conservative corporate variant of the social state in Germany as part of the concepts of order. In particular, we ask for the specific consequences of inclusion and exclusion and the social change which is achieved by the shift of these order patterns under the influence of neo-liberal ideas.

Werner Abelshauser recently elaborated the idea of social justice in the sense of “welfare for all” that is currently demanded by some political parties for election campaign purposes of have never been the subject of the order-related policy which forms the structural basis throughout five systems (German Empire, Weimar Republic, National Socialist era, Western Germany and reunited Germany). Abelshauser emphasizes that the concept of the social market economy was often misunderstood. It mainly referred to “a close symbiosis of economy and society fulfilling joint tasks in changing constellations” consisting of liberal interventionism, productive order-related policy, and of a social system of production that is well coordinated with the markets.<sup>45</sup> After the Second World War, this includes the reform of the old-age insurance which successfully prevented old people from sliding into poverty for a long

---

<sup>45</sup> Werner Abelshauser, Der »Rheinische Kapitalismus« im Kampf der Wirtschaftskulturen, in: Volker R. Berghahn, Sigurt Vitals (Ed.), Gibt es einen deutschen Kapitalismus? Tradition und Perspektiven der sozialen Marktwirtschaft, Frankfurt/Main 2006, pp. 186 – 199.

time, the support of the consumer goods industry to supply families with household goods, the capability of absorption of the labour market at that time, and last but not least the availability of affordable housing (social housing) in order to take care of the displaced people and returnees coming to Germany. The consequence of this was an enormous socio-economic inclusion.

Since the 1980s, however, it has become apparent that part of the population has slid into precarious living situations linked with long-term risks of exclusion for many of them. This observation provides the background for determining the existence of a gap of justice in Germany. In conclusion, we would like to point out the following problems:

Social insurance is designed to reward continuous full-time employment, but the corporately dominated labour market does not provide enough opportunities for the population capable of gainful employment. In the industrial sector, the permanent staff tends to decrease in numbers and to consist only of well-qualified employees in order to increase production for international competition. Temporary or permanent unemployment mainly affects school-leavers without a degree, the long-term unemployed, older employees with no advanced vocational training, and women with a discontinuous employment biography. Compared with the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries, Germany does not succeed in expanding the necessary consumer-oriented services that would compensate for the loss of jobs in the industrial sector and enable women to find employment by offering household-related services, neither through market economy nor by expanding employment in the public service.

What is biographically dramatic is that women see themselves forced to choose between employment and career or children. Female single parents, most of which find themselves in socio-economically difficult living situations, often fail in getting a satisfying job and in putting their children in professional all-day schools offering qualified support programmes. In Germany, the gradual integration of women into the labour market is not accompanied by an increasing labour volume and therefore, unlike in other countries, does not lead to an expansion of gainful employment in general and thus not to the stabilisation of life-long careers of employment.

For major parts of the population, a successful long-term integration into the labour market, which is the key condition for leading a possibly independent life without patronage, i.e. doing one's own task as Plato describes it, and ensuring their own social security represents an obstacle they cannot overcome. Furthermore, the privatisation of public goods such as municipal housing contributes to the fact that the lower classes have to spend their low economic capital on their costs of living, while the upper classes increasingly use their economic capital to afford cultural goods and thus enhance their status and social participation and symbolically stabilise it.

With its "mixed economy", focus on families and integration of associations and civil organisations, the German variant of capitalism (Rheinischer Kapitalismus) provides starting points for the establishment of many different ways of living that citizens consider to be just. There are numerous liberties, i.e. alternatives for access to social participations. However, as a consequence of the state's tendency to withdraw from "services of general interest" (Daseinsvorsorge) in the past decade, parts of the population are exposed to considerable risks they cannot cope with. Denying them the chance to do their own task, for example, getting influence in the big mainstream parties that carry the social state since the representative positions are already taken by middle and upper class careerists, poses a threat to the justice within the social order as well as peace and cohesion among people.